James Buchanan And The Political Crisis Of The 1850s

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Bosom Friends

Politics as Public Choice

The Soul of Classical Political Economy

The Reason of Rules

The Political Economy of James Buchanan

Inspired by F.A. Hayek's Individualism and Economic Order, this book also stands in contrast to the themes of that work, by emphasizing that collective action works differently from the way the market works. The chapters comprise papers written by James M. Buchanan, both with and without Yoon's co-authorship, after the publication of his Collected Work volumes. These chapters reflect the authors' thoughts on politics, seen through the lens of fiscal policy and the tragedies of the commons and anti-commons in collective action. The pathologies of democratic politics rigorously analyzed in the book prove the relevance of Buchanan's constitutionalism.

Politics as Public Choice

The Soul of Classical Political Economy

Although none of his contemporaries considered Buchanan a political genius or a brilliant statesman, many thought in 1856 that he was the right man for the times. Few have assumed the office of the presidency with such a sterling résumé as Buchanan. With many years of experience, including stints as a member of the United States House of Representatives and Senate, Minister to Russia, Secretary of State, and Minister to Great Britain, he seemed well equipped to deal with the brewing sectional crisis he faced as president. Buchanan entered office during a time that required strong and decisive presidential leadership. Yet, despite his years of political experience, James Buchanan failed to provide that leadership. This book examines the life and presidency of James Buchanan and seeks to explain why such an experienced politician failed the test of leadership in a time of national crisis.

The Reason of Rules

A survey of the political economy of James Buchanan seeking to explain his theories in detail and evaluate them in depth, covering topics such as the constitution and its failure, democracy, operational rules for the constitution and economics.

The Political Economy of James Buchanan
A political economist whose numerous and influential writings explore the no-man's-land that separates the social science disciplines. The founder of the constitutional economics paradigm, Buchanan was awarded the 1986 Nobel Prize in economic science for his contributions to a theory of constitutional political economy as well as his leadership of the public choice movement. In this volume, David Reisman seeks to explain and analyze the important insights of this difficult but stimulating multidisciplinary figure. Buchanan's recommendation of constitutional precommitment will appeal to all economists who share his conviction that politicians and bureaucrats, where not preconstrained by rules that they cannot alter at will, tend rapidly to become not servants but the masters of the electorate. His determination to define and defend the middle ground, neither anarchy nor Leviathan, will have a wider appeal still.

**The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan**

"The Limits of Liberty is concerned mainly with two topics. One is an attempt to construct a new contractarian theory of the state, and the other deals with its legitimate limits. The latter is a matter of great practical importance and is of no small significance from the standpoint of political philosophy." — Scott Gordon, Journal of Political Economy James Buchanan offers a strikingly innovative approach to a pervasive problem of social philosophy. The problem is one of the classic paradoxes concerning man's freedom in society: in order to protect individual freedom, the state must restrict each person's right to act. Employing the techniques of modern economic analysis, Professor Buchanan reveals the conceptual basis of an individual's social rights by examining the evolution and development of these rights out of presocial conditions.

**James M. Buchanan**

**Exploring the Political Economy and Social Philosophy of James M. Buchanan**

This book focuses on the effects of applying a generality constraint on the political process.

**President James Buchanan and the Crisis of National Leadership**

When Buchanan entered the White House in March 1857, he seemed well positioned to accomplish his main objectives. A canny and seasoned politician from Pennsylvania with a reputation for moderation on slavery-related issues, Buchanan had a straightforward agenda: the amelioration of sectional tensions, the promotion of American prosperity, and the extension of the Democrats' control of the federal government. Four years later, Buchanan left Washington convinced that he had done his best and accomplished much. In fact, he left behind a shattered Democratic party, a new Republican president, Abraham Lincoln, and a ruptured Union. Except for a cadre of faithful Pennsylvania friends, Buchanan's reputation lay in ruins. He has consistently been ranked among the least effective presidents in American history.

**Hon. James Buchanan**

"Politicians James Buchanan (1791-1868) of Pennsylvania and William Rufus King (1786-1853) of Alabama has excited much speculation through the years. Why did they never marry? Might they have been gay, or was their relationship a nineteenth-century version of the modern-day 'bromance'? Then, as now, they have intrigued by
the many mysteries surrounding them. In Bosom Friends: the Intimate World of James Buchanan and William Rufus King, Thomas Balcerski explores the lives of these two politicians and discovers one of the most significant collaborations in American political history. Unlikely companions from the start, they lived together as messmates in a Washington, D.C., boardinghouse. There developed a bosom friendship that blossomed into a significant political partnership. Before the Civil War, each man was elected to high executive office, William Rufus King the vice-presidency in 1852 and James Buchanan as the nation's fifteen president in 1856. This book offers a dual biography of James Buchanan and William Rufus King. Special attention is given to their early lives prior to elected office, the circumstances of their boardinghouse friendship, and the juicy political gossip that has circulated about them ever since. In addition, the author traces their many contributions to the Jacksonian political agenda, manifest destiny, and the debates over slavery, while finding their style of politics to have been disastrous for the American nation. Ultimately, Bosom Friends demonstrates that intimate male friendships among politicians were, and continue to be, an important part of success in American politics.—

The Soul of Classical Political Economy

Societies function on the basis of rules. These rules, rather like the rules of the road, coordinate the activities of individuals who have a variety of goals and purposes. Whether the rules work well or ill, and how they can be made to work better, is a matter of major concern. Appropriately interpreted, the working of social rules is also the central subject matter of modern political economy. This book is about rules - what they are, how they work, and how they can be properly analysed. The authors' objective is to understand the workings of alternative political institutions so that choices among such institutions (rules) can be more fully informed. Thus, broadly defined, the methodology of constitutional political economy is the subject matter of The Reason of Rules. The authors have examined how rules for political order work, how such rules might be chosen, and how normative criteria for such choices might be established.

James Buchanan

Just 24 hours after former President James Buchanan died on June 1, 1868, the Chicago Tribune rejoiced: "This desolate old man has gone to his grave. No son or daughter is doomed to acknowledge an ancestry from him." Nearly a century and a half later, in 2004, writer Christopher Buckley observed "It is probably just as well that James Buchanan was our only bachelor president. There are no descendants bracing every morning on opening the paper to find another heading announcing: 'Buchanan Once Again Rated Worst President in History.' " How to explain such remarkably consistent historical views of the man who turned over a divided and demoralized country to Abraham Lincoln, the same man regarded through the decades by presidential scholars as the worst president in U.S. history? In this exploration of the presidency of James Buchanan, 1857-61, Garry Boulard revisits the 15th President and comes away with a stunning conclusion: Buchanan's performance as the nation's chief executive was even more deplorable and sordid than scholars generally know, making his status as the country's worst president richly deserved. Boulard documents Buchanan's failure to stand up to the slaveholding interests of the South, his indecisiveness in dealing with the secession movement, and his inability to provide leadership during the nation's gravest constitutional crisis. Using the letters of Buchanan, as well as those of more than two dozen political leaders and thinkers of the time, Boulard presents a narrative of a timid and vacillating president whose drift and isolation opened the door to the Civil War. The author of The Expatriation of Franklin Pierce: The Story of a President and the Civil War (iUniverse, 2006), Boulard has reported for the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times and is a business writer for the Albuquerque-based Construction Reporter.
The Contractarian Constitutional Political Economy of James Buchanan

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Buchanan's Tensions

Bonded Leather binding

James Buchanan

“This book is a scholarly introduction for the general reader on the most important political actors and documents of the American revolutionary era that shaped Abraham Lincoln's politics”--

Politics by Principle, Not Interest

James McGill Buchanan (1919 - 2013) was an American economist best known as a pioneer of public choice theory. A founder of the new Virginia school of political economy, he made extensive contributions to the theory of public finance, constitutional economics, rent-seeking, and the economic analysis of politics. Buchanan's work offered a scientific basis for conservative and libertarian political endeavors such as a constitutional amendment to balance the federal budget. He was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1986.

The Role of Homo Oeconomicus in the Political Economy of James Buchanan

Each chapter in this volume seeks to explore, critique, and emphasize the continuing relevance of the vast contributions of Buchanan to our understanding of political economy and social philosophy.

The Political Economy of James Buchanan

This monumental twenty-volume series presents the writings of James M. Buchanan, one of the great twentieth-century scholars of liberty. Buchanan, the Nobel laureate in Economics in 1986, has much wisdom to offer--not just to economists and academics--but to all who seek to understand the challenges and opportunities of governance in our age. "This is a series," write the editors, "that no serious scholar of public choice theory, public economics, or contemporary political theory will want to be without. It has--perhaps more than any other contemporary scholar--helped us to view politics without the romantic gloss that characterizes much normative political theory and that slips unthinkingly into so much popular commentary. Buchanan has been a resolute defender of "the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals" and has been a painstaking analyst of the institutional structure that might best support such a society. Buchanan stands with von Mises, Hayek, Popper, and Friedman as one of the great twentieth-century scholars of liberty." The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan is a vast and significant twenty-volume series that includes ten monographs and all of the important journal articles, papers, and essays that Buchanan has produced in a
distinguished career spanning more than half a century. Among the monographs are such famous works as The Calculus of Consent (coauthored by Gordon Tullock) and The Limits of Liberty, as well as such gems as Cost and Choice: An Inquiry in Economic Theory. The monographs have been cast into a new format, and in those cases in which no index, or only a partial index, was originally provided, new indexes have been created. In addition, each volume includes a foreword by one of the three editors of the series, each of whom is a distinguished economist in his own right. Volume 20 presents a comprehensive index to the entire series and an annotated copy of the entire curriculum vitae, indicating in which volume in the series the various items appear and, correspondingly, those items that have been omitted. The Collected Works of James Buchanan is an important contribution to the study of an important economist and a scholar of liberty, a man who has always been able to view his work from an appropriate perspective. As James Buchanan has written, "My interest in understanding how the economics interaction process works has always been instrumental to the more inclusive purpose of understanding how we can learn to live with one another without engaging in Hobbesian war and without sacrificing ourselves to the dictates of the state." James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty of the twentieth century. He is also Professor Emeritus at George Mason and Virginia Tech Universities. Gordon Tullock is Professor Emeritus of Law at George Mason University, where he was Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Study of Public Choice and University Professor of Law and Economics. He also taught at the University of South Carolina, the University of Virginia, Rice University, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, and the University of Arizona. In 1966 he founded the journal that became Public Choice and remained its editor until 1990. The entire series includes: Volume 1: The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty Volume 2: Public Principles of Public Debt Volume 3: The Calculus of Consent Volume 4: Public Finance in Democratic Process Volume 5: The Demand and Supply of Public Goods Volume 6: Cost and Choice Volume 7: The Limits of Liberty Volume 8: Democracy in Deficit Volume 9: The Power to Tax Volume 10: The Reason of Rules Volume 11: Politics by Principle, Not Interest Volume 12: Economic Inquiry and Its Logic Volume 13: Politics as Public Choice Volume 14: Debt and Taxes Volume 15: Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory Volume 16: Choice, Contract, and Constitutions Volume 17: Moral Science and Moral Order Volume 18: Federalism, Liberty, and the Law Volume 19: Ideas, Persons, and Events Volume 20: Indexes

**James Buchanan**

**The Worlds of James Buchanan and Thaddeus Stevens**

**James Buchanan and the Political Crisis of the 1850s**

The Worlds of James Buchanan and Thaddeus Stevens examines the political interests, relationships, and practices of two of the era’s most prominent politicians as well as the political landscapes they inhabited and informed. Both men called Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, their home, and both were bachelors. During the 1850s, James Buchanan tried to keep the Democratic Party alive as the slavery debate divided his peers and the political system. Thaddeus Stevens, meanwhile, as Whig turned Republican, invested in the federal government to encourage economic development and social reform, especially antislavery and Republican Reconstruction. Considering Buchanan and Stevens's divergent lives alongside their political and social worlds reveals the dynamics and directions of American politics, especially northern interests and identities. While focusing on these individuals, the contributors also explore the roles of parties and patronage in informing political loyalties and behavior. They further track personal connections across lines of gender and geography and underline the importance of details like who regularly dined and
conversed with whom, the complex social milieu of Washington, the role of rumor in determining political allegiances, and the ways personality and failing relationships mattered in a hothouse of national politics fueled by slavery and expansion. The essays in The Worlds of James Buchanan and Thaddeus Stevens collectively invite further consideration of how parties, personality, place, and private lives influenced the political interests and actions of an age affected by race, religion, region, civil war, and reconstruction.

James Buchanan, the Conservatives' Choice, 1856

"A fine collection of essays exploring, and in many cases extending, Jim Buchanan's many contributions and insights to economic, political, and social theory." – Bruce Caldwell, Professor of Economics, Duke University, USA

"The overwhelming impression the reader gets from this very fine collection is the extraordinary expanse of James Buchanan's work. Everyone interested in economics and related fields can profit mightily from this book." – Mario Rizzo, Professor of Economics, New York University, USA

This book explores the academic contribution of James Buchanan, who received the Nobel Prize for economics in 1986. Buchanan’s receipt of the Prize is noteworthy because he was a maverick within the economics profession. In contrast to the preponderance of economists, Buchanan made little use of mathematics and no use of econometrics, preferring to used logic and language to insert his ideas into the scholarly community. Moreover, his ideas extended the domain of economic inquiry along many paths that numerous economists subsequently pursued. Buchanan’s scholarship brought economics and political science together under the rubric of public choice. He was also was a prime figure in bringing economic theory into closer contact with moral and social philosophy. This volume includes essays distributed across the extensive domain of Buchanan’s scholarly contributions, reflecting the range of his scholarly interests. Chapters will examine Buchanan’s scholarly work on public finance, social insurance, public debt, public choice, economic methodology, constitutional political economy, law and economics, and ethics and social theory. The book also examines Buchanan in relation to other prominent economists, both from the distant past and the recent past.

The Worst President--The Story of James Buchanan

Worst. President. Ever.

A provocative reconsideration of a presidency on the brink of Civil War Almost no president was as well trained and well prepared for the office as James Buchanan. He had served in the Pennsylvania state legislature, the U.S. House, and the U.S. Senate; he was Secretary of State and was even offered a seat on the Supreme Court. And yet, by every measure except his own, James Buchanan was a miserable failure as president, leaving office in disgrace. Virtually all of his intentions were thwarted by his own inability to compromise: he had been unable to resolve issues of slavery, caused his party to split-thereby ensuring the election of the first Republican president, Abraham Lincoln—and made the Civil War all but inevitable. Historian Jean H. Baker explains that we have rightly placed Buchanan at the end of the presidential rankings, but his poor presidency should not be an excuse to forget him. To study Buchanan is to consider the implications of weak leadership in a time of national crisis. Elegantly written, Baker's volume offers a balanced look at a crucial moment in our nation's history and explores a man who, when given the opportunity, failed to rise to the challenge.

Mr. Buchanan's Administration on the Eve of the Rebellion

Democracy in Deficit
James M. Buchanan, a prominent political economist of the 20th century and a Nobel laureate in economics, was a founding thinker of the public choice tradition and was instrumental in the reintroduction of politics into economic analysis. He was also an intellectual entrepreneur who developed new and innovative centers for research, graduate programs, and outlets for academic publication. Having taught at a variety of institutions, including the University of Tennessee, Florida State University, the University of Virginia, and Virginia Tech, he moved the Center for Study of Public Choice to George Mason University in 1983, where he remained for the rest of his academic career. After his passing in 2013, the Special Collections Research Center for the Mason University Libraries began to compile a formal archive, the James M. Buchanan Papers, documenting Buchanan's contributions to social science and his intellectual legacy. This volume, The Soul of Classical Political Economy: James M. Buchanan from the Archives, edited by Peter J. Boettke and Alain Marciano, provides a unique window into not only the man, the scholar, and the teacher, but also the fields of public choice and public economics that Buchanan advanced over his productive and esteemed career. The sections in this volume correspond to important themes for understanding Buchanan's views on political economy as a social philosophy. The editors illustrate Buchanan's views by using archival material—most of it original and previously unpublished—and offering context as a guide through the evolution of Buchanan's expansive scholarship that took place over roughly seven decades and spanned the fields of philosophy, politics, and economics. This volume is essential reading for anyone interested in Buchanan's work, in public choice theory, and in the continuing study of political economy.

Buchanan and Breckinridge

The Calculus of Consent

The Calculus of Consent, the second volume of Liberty Fund's The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock, is a reprint edition of the groundbreaking economic classic written by two of the world's preeminent economists—Gordon Tullock and Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan. This book is a unique blend of economics and political science that helped create significant new subfields in each discipline respectively, namely, the public choice school and constitutional political economy. Charles K. Rowley, Duncan Black Professor of Economics at George Mason University, points out in his introduction, "The Calculus of Consent is, by a wide margin, the most widely cited publication of each coauthor and, by general agreement, their most important scientific contribution." The Calculus of Consent is divided into four parts, each consisting of several chapters. The introduction by Professor Rowley provides a short overview of the book and identifies key insights that permeated the bounds of economics and political science and created an enduring nexus between the two sciences. Part I of The Calculus of Consent establishes the conceptual framework of the book's subject; part II defines the realm of social choice; part III applies the logic developed in part II to describe a range of decision-making rules, most notably, the rule of simple majority; and part IV explores the economics and ethics of democracy. Gordon Tullock is Professor Emeritus of Law at George Mason University, where he was Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Study of Public Choice and Professor of Law and Economics. He also taught at the University of South Carolina, the University of Virginia, Rice University, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, and the University of Arizona. In 1966 he founded the journal that became Public Choice and remained its editor until 1990. James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty of the twentieth century. He is also Professor Emeritus at George Mason and Virginia Tech Universities. Charles K. Rowley was Duncan Black Professor of Economics at George Mason University and a Senior Fellow of the James M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy at George Mason University. He was also General Director of the Locke Institute.
James Buchanan and the Coming of the Civil War

James M. Buchanan and Liberal Political Economy: A Rational Reconstruction examines the contemporary meaning and significance of James M. Buchanan's body of work. The book uses Buchanan's past contributions to explore the present and future relevance of his scholarly contributions and insights. It seeks mainly to explain what insight for their work contemporary scholars might acquire by becoming familiar with some of Buchanan's formulations. Buchanan was one of the most creative and prolific scholars of political economy during the post-war period. Not only was his body of work so immense that it could not be contained within 20 volumes of Collected Works, but also Buchanan's scholarship made such strong contact with law, ethics, and political science that he could easily have served as a poster-child for the programs in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics which have been gaining momentum in recent years. Buchanan spoke for a style of economics that made wide and firm contact with the full range of the humane studies. This book emphasizes those features of Buchanan's thought that seem relevant for contemporary scholarship within the broadly liberal tradition of political economy.

Life of James Buchanan

Finalist for the 2017 National Book Award "[A ] vibrant intellectual history of the radical right . . ." - The Atlantic "This sixty-year campaign to make libertarianism mainstream and eventually take the government itself is at the heart of Democracy in Chains. . . . If you're worried about what all this means for America's future, you should be" - NPR A n explosive expos of the right's relentless campaign to eliminate unions, suppress voting, privatize public education, and change the Constitution. Behind today's headlines of billionaires taking over our government is a secretive political establishment with long, deep, and troubling roots. The capitalist radical right has been working not simply to change who rules, but to fundamentally alter the rules of democratic governance. But billionaires did not launch this movement; a white intellectual in the embattled Jim Crow South did. Democracy in Chains names its true architect--the Nobel Prize-winning political economist James McGill Buchanan--and dissects the operation he and his colleagues designed over six decades to alter every branch of government to disempower the majority. In a brilliant and engaging narrative, Nancy MacLean shows how Buchanan forged his ideas about government in a last gasp attempt to preserve the white elite's power in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education. In response to the widening of American democracy, he developed a brilliant, if diabolical, plan to undermine the ability of the majority to use its numbers to level the playing field between the rich and powerful and the rest of us. Corporate donors and their right-wing foundations were only too eager to support Buchanan's work in teaching others how to divide America into "makers" and "takers." And when a multibillionaire on a messianic mission to rewrite the social contract of the modern world, Charles Koch, discovered Buchanan, he created a vast, relentless, and multi-armed machine to carry out Buchanan's strategy. Without Buchanan's ideas and Koch's money, the libertarian right would not have succeeded in its stealth takeover of the Republican Party as a delivery mechanism. Now, with Mike Pence as Vice President, the cause has a longtime loyalist in the White House, not to mention a phalanx of Republicans in the House, the Senate, a majority of state governments, and the courts, all carrying out the plan. That plan includes harsher laws to undermine unions, privatizing everything from schools to health care and Social Security, and keeping as many of us as possible from voting. Based on ten years of unique research, Democracy in Chains tells a chilling story of right-wing academics and big money run amok. This revelatory work of scholarship is also a call to arms to protect the achievements of twentieth-century American self-government.

James M. Buchanan

"Buchanan's Tensions: Reexamining the Political Economy and Philosophy of James M. Buchanan," a collection of eight original scholarly essays, presents a critical
assess ment of Buchanan's research and ideas.

James M. Buchanan and Liberal Political Economy

Special Issue: James Buchanan's Constitutional Political Economy

The Limits of Liberty

This volume presents a collection of thirty-four essays and shorter works by James M. Buchanan that represent the brilliance of his founding work on public-choice theory. The work of James M. Buchanan is perhaps most often associated with his helping to found public-choice theory. Buchanan's book-length works such as The Calculus of Consent or The Reason of Rules (Volumes 3 and 10, respectively, in Liberty Fund's The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan) are best known for their brilliant application of market behavioral models to government. But Buchanan's shorter works represented here all show originality and insight as well as clear articulation of important theoretical principles. What's more, these essays have all had a significant impact on the subsequent literature about public choice. In this volume, the works are broken down into these major categorical groupings: 1. General Approach 2. Public Choice and Its Critics 3. Voters 4. Voting Models 5. Rent Seeking 6. Regulation 7. Public Choice and Public Expenditures As Robert D. Tollison concludes his foreword to this volume, "Read in conjunction with the other parts of the 'Collected Works,' these papers offer the reader a fuller appreciation of the public-choice revolution and its impact and prospects." James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century. The entire series will include: Volume 1: The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty Volume 2: Public Principles of Public Debt Volume 3: The Calculus of Consent Volume 4: Public Finance in Democratic Process Volume 5: The Demand and Supply of Public Goods Volume 6: Cost and Choice Volume 7: The Limits of Liberty Volume 8: Democracy in Deficit Volume 9: The Power to Tax Volume 10: The Reason of Rules Volume 11: Politics by Principle, Not Interest Volume 12: Economic Inquiry and Its Logic Volume 13: Politics as Public Choice Volume 14: Debt and Taxes Volume 15: Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory Volume 16: Choice, Contract, and Constitutions Volume 17: Moral Science and Moral Order Volume 18: Federalism, Liberty, and the Law Volume 19: Ideas, Persons, and Events Volume 20: Indexes

The Political Ascent of James Buchanan

Democracy in Deficit is one of the early comprehensive attempts to apply the basic principles of public-choice analysis to macroeconomic theory and policy. According to Robert D. Tollison in the foreword, "The central purpose of the book was to examine the simple precepts of Keynesian economics through the lens of public-choice theory. The basic discovery was that Keynesian economics had a bias toward deficits in terms of political self-interest." Democracy in Deficit opened the door for much of the current work on political business cycles and the incorporation of public-choice considerations into macroeconomic theory. Even in the area of monetarism, Buchanan's landmark work has greatly influenced the sway of contemporary theorists away from the nearly universally held belief of Keynesian theory. Democracy in Deficit contributes greatly to Buchanan's lifelong fiscal and monetary rules to guide long-term policy in macroeconomics. The book serves to bolster Buchanan's central beliefs in the necessity of a balanced-budget amendment to the U.S. Constitution and in monetary rules rather than central bank discretion. The book is co-authored with Richard Wagner, a respected colleague of Buchanan, whom Buchanan recognized as helping to keep the book free of polemics and on target with its central purpose of applying the elementary theory of public choice. James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic
Online Library James Buchanan And The Political Crisis Of The 1850s

Individualism and Political Disorder

This biography introduces readers to James Buchanan including his early political career and key events from Buchanan’s administration including the Dred Scott case and the secession of seven Southern states prior to the American Civil War. Information about his childhood, family, personal life, and retirement years is included. A timeline, fast facts, and sidebars provide additional information.

President James Buchanan a Biography

Worst. President. Ever. flips the great presidential biography on its head, offering an enlightening—and highly entertaining!—account of poor James Buchanan’s presidency to prove once and for all, that well, few leaders could have done worse. But author Robert Strauss does much more, leading readers out of Buchanan’s terrible term in office—meddling in the Dred Scott Supreme Court decision, exacerbating the Panic of 1857, helping foment the John Brown uprisings and “Bloody Kansas,” virtually inviting a half-dozen states to secede from the Union as a lame duck, and on and on—to explore with insight and humor his own obsession with presidents, and ultimately the entire notion of ranking our presidents. He guides us through the POTUS rating game of historians and others who have made their own Mount Rushmores—or Marianas Trenches!—of presidential achievement, showing why Buchanan easily loses to any of the others, but also offering insights into presidential history buffs like himself, the forgotten "lesser" presidential sites, sex and the presidency, the presidency itself, and how and why it can often take the best measures out of even the most dedicated men.

Democracy in Chains

James M. Buchanan, a prominent political economist of the 20th century and a Nobel laureate in economics, was a founding thinker of the public choice tradition and was instrumental in the reintroduction of politics into economic analysis. He was also an intellectual entrepreneur who developed new and innovative centers for research, graduate programs, and outlets for academic publication. Having taught at a variety of institutions, including the University of Tennessee, Florida State University, the University of Virginia, and Virginia Tech, he moved the Center for Study of Public Choice to George Mason University in 1983, where he remained for the rest of his academic career. After his passing in 2013, the Special Collections Research Center for the Mason University Libraries began to compile a formal archive, the James M. Buchanan Papers, documenting Buchanan's contributions to social science and his intellectual legacy. This volume, The Soul of Classical Political Economy: James M. Buchanan from the Archives, edited by Peter J. Boettke and Alain Marciano, provides a unique window into not only the man, the scholar, and the teacher, but also the fields of public choice and public economics that Buchanan advanced over his productive and esteemed career. The sections in this volume correspond to important themes for understanding Buchanan's views on political economy as a social
philosophy. The editors illustrate Buchanan's views by using archival material—most of it original and previously unpublished—and offering context as a guide through the evolution of Buchanan's expansive scholarship that took place over roughly seven decades and spanned the fields of philosophy, politics, and economics. This volume is essential reading for anyone interested in Buchanan's work, in public choice theory, and in the continuing study of political economy.

"Provides scholars with a fresh and thoughtful examination of the first administration that had to deal with Southern secession."—Jonathan M. Atkins, author of "Politics, Parties, and the Sectional Conflict in Tennessee, 1832-1861" As James Buchanan took office in 1857, the United States found itself at a crossroads. Dissolution of the Union had been averted and the Democratic Party maintained control of the federal government, but the nation watched to see if Pennsylvania's first president could make good on his promise to calm sectional tensions. Despite Buchanan's central role in a crucial hour in U.S. history, few presidents have been more ignored by historians. In assembling the essays for this volume, Michael Birkner and John Quist have asked leading scholars to reconsider whether Buchanan's failures stemmed from his own mistakes or from circumstances that no president could have overcome. Buchanan's dealings with Utah shed light on his handling of the secession crisis. His approach to Dred Scott reinforces the image of a president whose doughface views were less a matter of hypocrisy than a thorough identification with southern interests. Essays on the secession crisis provide fodder for debate about the strengths and limitations of presidential authority in an existential moment for the young nation. Although the essays in this collection offer widely differing interpretations of Buchanan's presidency, they all grapple honestly with the complexities of the issues faced by the man who sat in the White House prior to the towering figure of Lincoln, and contribute to a deeper understanding of a turbulent and formative era. John W. Quist is professor of history at Shippensburg University and author of "Restless Visionaries." Michael J. Birkner is Franklin Professor of Liberal Arts, professor of history at Gettysburg College, and editor of "James Buchanan and the Political Crisis of the 1850s."

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